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Quantum protocols for the millionaire problem with a third party are trivial
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Recently there were many quantum protocols devoted to solve the millionaire problem and private
comparison problem by adding a semi-honest third party. They all require complicated quantum
methods, while still leak a non-trivial amount of information to at least one of the parties. But it
will be shown here that once the third party is introduced, there are very simple protocols which
require quantum key distribution as the only quantum resource, and the amount of information
leaked can be made arbitrarily small. Furthermore, even a dishonest third party cannot spoil the
protocols. Thus our solutions surpass all existing protocols on both feasibility and security.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
The millionaire problem [1] was originally a two-party
secure computation problem, in which two millionaires,
Alice and Bob, want to know which of them is richer
without revealing their actual wealth. It is analogous
to a more general problem whose goal is to compare two
numbers a and b, without revealing any extra information
on their values other than what can be inferred from
the comparison result. There is also a variation called
the socialist millionaire problem [2], in which Alice and
Bob want to determine if their wealth a and b are equal,
without disclosing any extra information on the values
of a and b to each other. As typical examples of secure
multi-party computations, these problems play essential
roles in cryptography. They have many applications in e-
commerce and data mining where people need to compare
numbers which are confidential.
Nevertheless, the original solution [1] to the problems
needs to rely on oblivious transfer [3], which is hard to
achieve unconditional security even in quantum cryptog-
raphy [4–8]. Therefore, people considered a relaxed set-
ting of the problems which involves an additional semi-
honest third party, generally called Trent (or TP). Trent
communicates with Alice and Bob separately. He is re-
garded as semi-honest because, on one hand, they study
only the case where he executes the protocol faithfully,
and loyally keeps the data he exchanges with one party
secret from the other. That is, he will not try to spoil the
protocol, nor he will help either Alice or Bob to cheat.
On the other hand, he is not fully trustable as he may
attempt to learn the values of a and b or the compari-
son result, by methods such as eavesdropping or inter-
cepting the classical and quantum channels between the
other two parties, or faking the quantum states which
look authentic to Alice and Bob while entangled with his
ancillary systems that can provide him additional infor-
mations, etc.
Under this scenario, the problems become a three-
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party cryptography, so that the existing impossibility
proofs [4–8] on two-party secure computations do not
necessarily apply. Therefore, many quantum protocols
were proposed. Jia et al. [9] gave a solution to the
millionaire problem, while the others [10–22] studied the
socialist millionaire problem under the name “quantum
private comparison” (QPC).
In this paper, however, we will show that once the
third party is included, there exists simple solutions to
the problems which are basically classical protocols with
the assistance of quantum key distribution (QKD) [23].
On the contrary, all previous protocols for the million-
aire problem and QPC require a much greater amount of
quantum resources, such as entanglement, joint measure-
ments, quantum memory, decoy states, etc. Therefore
they are all inferior in feasibility and simplicity.
Moreover, our protocols have two security advantages
over the others. First, we will show that all previous
protocols [9–22] inevitably leak a non-trivial amount of
information to Trent or both Alice and Bob, while in
our protocols this can be avoided. Secondly, a dishonest
Trent can spoil many of the previous protocols [9, 13–22].
That is, he can mislead Alice and Bob to wrong results
even though it brings no advantage to himself. But in
our protocol such a dishonest behavior can be detected
with a probability that can be made arbitrarily close to
100%. Thus the only constraint on Trent in our protocols
is that he should not cheat together with either Alice or
Bob to steal the secret data of the other party. Other
than that, Trent can be fully distrustful.
In the next section, we will propose our simple protocol
for the millionaire problem, and prove its security. Then
we will show in section III how to adapt the protocol for
the QPC task. A detailed comparison on the feasibility
and security of our proposal and previous protocols will
be provided in section IV.
II. SIMPLE PROTOCOL FOR THE
MILLIONAIRE PROBLEM
Suppose that Alice has a secret number a, and Bob has
a secret number b. Like all previous works [9–22] on the
subject, in this paper we only consider the case where
2Alice and Bob will not try to spoil the protocol. That is,
they are willing to help each other to calculate the cor-
rect comparison result between a and b honestly, without
trying to input a wrong value of the secret number. The
only cheating that we need to take care of is that they
may attempt to learn extra information on the value of
the secret number of the other party, other than what
the comparison result naturally implies. Also, the third
party Trent will not help either Alice or Bob to cheat.
When dealing with the original millionaire problem,
we also assume that the case a = b will never happen.
Otherwise the comparison result will inevitably reveal
the values of a and b to both parties, so that it will be
impossible to reach the original goal of the millionaire
problem, which requires the values to remain unrevealed.
Note that the previous protocol [9] did not cover this case
either.
A. The basic protocol
For easy understanding, we first consider the case
where Trent will not try to spoil the protocol. To find
out which one of a and b is larger with the help of Trent,
Alice and Bob can use the following protocol.
Protocol P0:
(1) Alice and Bob share two random numbers c and λ
(λ 6= 0) through QKD. There is no restriction on the se-
lection range of c and λ as long as they are both real num-
bers. Their order of magnitude does not need to match
that of a and b. They can be either positive or negative,
and |λ| can be either larger or smaller than 1. Of course,
from a practical point of view, Alice and Bob can limit
c and λ to a finite range of rational numbers with a cer-
tain precision, so that they can be determined efficiently
through QKD. But it is important to keep these range
and precision secret from Trent, in order to minimize the
information on a and b leaked to Trent.
(2) Alice calculates
α = λa+ c, (1)
and sends α to Trent through QKD.
(3) Bob calculates
β = λb+ c, (2)
and sends β to Trent through QKD.
(4) Trent calculates
D = α− β, (3)
and sets R = 0 (R = 1) if D > 0 (D < 0). Then he
announces R to both Alice and Bob publicly.
(5) Alice and Bob will both know the comparison result
from λ and R. If (−1)Rλ > 0 then the result is a > b,
otherwise a < b.
Note that any information (including language, im-
ages, etc.) can be encoded digitally, and then presented
as binary strings and transferred via QKD, so that the
parties can virtually “talk” anything with QKD. There-
fore in the above protocol, a, b, c and λ are not limited to
bits nor integers, and do not have to be written directly
in binary representations and then mapped into quantum
operations bit by bit like they did in previous protocols
[10–22]. If Alice and Bob want to compare binary strings
bit by bit [10–22], or to compare many pairs of large
numbers [9], they can simply repeat our protocol many
times. Note that if both a and b are single bits, then the
comparison result will make Alice and Bob easily deduce
the secret number of each other. But this situation is in-
evitable by nature of the millionaire problem and QPC,
and also exists in all previous protocols [9–22].
The correctness of the protocol can easily be verified.
By combining equations (1) - (3), we have a− b = D/λ.
Since (−1)R actually represents the sign of D, (−1)Rλ
will have the same sign as that of a−b, and thus indicates
which one of a and b is larger.
B. The security proof
A distinct merit of our protocol is that other than using
QKD to protect the communications between the partic-
ipants, no more quantum method is involved. The rest
parts of the protocol are completely classical. Therefore,
given that QKD is unconditionally secure, the security
proof of the protocol is simple elementary mathematics.
From Trent’s point of view, since the information ex-
changed between Alice and Bob is secured by QKD, all
the information Trent obtained in the protocol is merely
the values of α and β, and the fact that they satisfy the
relationship described in equations (1) and (2). The val-
ues of a, b, c and λ are not available directly to him.
Since two equations are insufficient for determining four
unknown variates, Trent will find that there could be in-
finite solutions for a and b so that he cannot know which
one is larger.
In fact, suppose that there are u, v, c0 and λ0 satisfying
α = λ0u+ c0, (4)
and
β = λ0v + c0, (5)
then it can be verified that they also satisfy
α = (−λ0)v + (α+ β − c0), (6)
and
β = (−λ0)u + (α+ β − c0). (7)
That is, no matter Alice’s and Bob’s choices satisfy a = u,
b = v, c = c0, λ = λ0, or a = v, b = u, c = α +
β − c0, λ = −λ0, Trent will receive the same α and β.
3Therefore, a > b and a < b will both make sense to Trent
so that he cannot tell which one is the actual comparison
result. Also, as |λ| can be either larger or smaller than
1, the value of D = α − β will not manifest the order of
magnitude of |a− b|. The existence of c further prevents
Trent from getting information on |a/b| by calculating
α/β. Thus the protocol is unconditionally secure against
Trent.
From Alice’s point of view, since the information ex-
changed between Bob and Trent is secured by QKD, she
cannot know β. Consequently, besides her own a, all the
information she obtained in the protocol is merely the
values of c, λ and R. Here c and λ are randomly chosen
by her and Bob, which contain no information about b.
Meanwhile, R carries 1 bit of information only. Accord-
ing to information theory, this amount is insufficient to
determine b as long as the number of possible values of
b is more than 3. Therefore the protocol is also uncon-
ditionally secure against Alice. The security against Bob
can be proven similarly.
C. The complete protocol
Now let us deal with the case where Trent tries to spoil
the protocol, i.e., he wants to mislead Alice and Bob to
a wrong result of the comparison. In the above Protocol
P0, this can be done by announcing a wrong value of R
in step (4). That is, when Trent finds R = 0 (R = 1),
he announces R = 1 (R = 0) instead. Consequently,
Alice and Bob will both obtain a wrong result on the
relationship between a and b, without knowing that Trent
has played the trick. Note that most previous protocols
[9, 13–22] have the same problem too. But here we can
avoid this cheating by extending Protocol P0 into the
following complete protocol for the millionaire problem.
Protocol P1:
(i) Let a and b denote Alice’s and Bob’s secret numbers,
respectively, that they want to compare. They decide and
share a large integer n and an index i0 ∈ [1, n] through
QKD, and keep them secret from Trent.
(ii) Alice and Bob choose n pairs of numbers ai and
bi (i = 1, 2, ..., n) in the following way. For i = i0, Alice
takes ai = a and Bob takes bi = b. For all other i’s,
they take ai and bi as two numbers that are known to
each other but kept secret from Trent, e.g., for simplicity
Alice can always takes ai = 2 and Bob takes bi = 1.
(iii) For i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare ai and bi
with the help of Trent using Protocol P0, each time with
a different set of the parameters c and λ. That is:
(iii-1) Alice and Bob share two random numbers
ci and λi (λi 6= 0) through QKD.
(iii-2) Alice calculates
αi = λiai + ci, (8)
and sends αi to Trent through QKD.
(iii-3) Bob calculates
βi = λibi + ci, (9)
and sends βi to Trent through QKD.
(iii-4) Trent calculates
Di = αi − βi, (10)
and sets Ri = 0 (Ri = 1) if Di > 0 (Di < 0). Then he
announces Ri to both Alice and Bob publicly.
(iv) Alice and Bob will both know the compari-
son result between a and b from λio and Rio , i.e., if
(−1)Rioλio > 0 then the result is a > b, otherwise a < b.
(v) The security check: For each i 6= i0, Alice and
Bob check whether Trent’s announced Ri always matches
their ai, bi and λi. For example, if they always take
ai = 2 and bi = 1 (∀i 6= i0), then there should always
be (−1)Riλi > 0. Whenever a mismatched value of Ri is
found, they know that Trent is cheating.
We can see that Protocol P1 is simply repeating Pro-
tocol P0 for n runs, with each run comparing a different
pair of ai and bi. In the i0-th run they compare the
values of a and b that they are really interested, while
in the other n − 1 runs both ai and bi are known to
them. Therefore, among all the Ri’s (i = 1, ..., n) Trent
announced, n − 1 of them will be checked in step (v).
If Trent tries to spoil the protocol by announcing wrong
values of Ri’s in more than one run, he will be caught
in step (v) with probability 100%. On the other hand,
since Trent does not know i0, if he announces a wrong
value of Ri in merely one single run of Protocol P0, there
will only be a probability 1/n that the run he chooses is
exactly the i0-th run. As a consequence, by increasing
n, the probability for Trent to spoil the protocol without
being detected can be made arbitrarily small.
III. THE QUANTUM PRIVATE COMPARISON
PROTOCOL
When applying Protocol P0 directly for the socialist
millionaire problem, a.k.a. quantum private comparison
(QPC), there will be a security loophole. That is, Trent
can always know the comparison result (a = b or a 6= b)
by checking whether there is D = 0. Note that this is
also the case in the protocols proposed in Refs. [13–
17, 20, 21]. But it is surely better if the loophole can
be avoided. Here we show that this goal can indeed be
achieved by slightly modifying our above Protocol P1, as
described below.
Protocol P2:
(I) Let a and b denote Alice’s and Bob’s secret num-
bers, respectively, that they want to compare. They de-
cide and share two large integers m, n (m < n) and a set
of indices S = {i0, i1, i2, ..., im} through QKD, and keep
them secret from Trent. Here, each ij in S is a randomly
4chosen integer within the range [1, n], and all ij’s have
different values. Note that the values of i0, i1, i2, ..., im
do not need to be in ascending nor descending order.
(II) Alice and Bob choose n pairs of numbers ai and bi
(i = 1, 2, ..., n) in the following way. If i = i0, then Alice
takes ai = a and Bob takes bi = b. Otherwise Bob always
takes bi = 1, while Alice takes ai = 1 if i ∈ {i1, i2, ..., im},
or ai 6= 1 if i /∈ S.
(III) For i = 1 to n, Alice and Bob compare ai and bi
with the help of Trent using a process similar to Protocol
P0. That is:
(III-1) Alice and Bob share two random numbers
ci and λi (λi 6= 0) through QKD.
(III-2) Alice calculates
αi = λiai + ci, (11)
and sends αi to Trent through QKD.
(III-3) Bob calculates
βi = λibi + ci, (12)
and sends βi to Trent through QKD.
(III-4) Trent announces publicly to Alice and Bob
whether αi = βi or not.
(IV) Alice and Bob will both know whether a = b or
not according to Trent’s announced result on αi0 and βi0
in the i0-th run of step (III-4).
(V) The security check: For each i 6= i0, Alice and Bob
check whether Trent’s announced result always matches
their ai, bi. That is, Trent’s announcement should always
be αi = βi for ∀i ∈ {i1, i2, ..., im}, or αi 6= βi for ∀i /∈ S.
Otherwise he is cheating.
The key idea of this protocol is: Alice and Bob compare
many pairs of ai and bi, most of which (except ai0 and
bi0) have nothing to do with their actual secret numbers
a and b. The purpose of introducing these extra pairs is
merely to confuse Trent.
The security of the protocol is also obvious. Note that
unlike step (4) of the original Protocol P0, here in step
(III-4) Trent merely announces whether αi and βi are
equal or not, without announcing which one is larger.
Therefore in the case a 6= b, Alice and Bob cannot deduce
whether a > b or a < b like they did in step (5) of P0,
so that no further information on a and b is leaked to
them. From Trent’s point of view, no matter a = b or
a 6= b, he will find αi = βi (i.e., ai = bi) in some runs of
step (III-4). He has no idea whether these runs include
a and b or not, as the values of i0 and m are protected
by the QKD process between Alice and Bob. Given that
QKD is unconditionally secure, we achieve the goal that
the final comparison between a and b is kept secret from
Trent. Again, no other quantum methods are required
besides QKD.
From the similarity between Protocols P1 and P2, we
can easily see that P2 can also prevent Trent from spoil-
ing the protocol for the same reason in section II C.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN EXISTING
PROTOCOLS
A. Feasibility comparison
We summarized the comparison on the technical re-
quirement of our above proposal and previous protocols
in Table I. Note that only the one in Ref. [9] and our
Protocol P1 deal with the original millionaire problem,
i.e., finding the larger one among a and b. The rest (in-
cluding our Protocol P2) are all QPC protocols, which
only compare whether a and b (or X and Y in Refs. [10–
15, 18–21], SA and SB in Ref. [22]) are equal, without
judging which one is larger. Also, Ref. [12] pointed out
that the original protocol in Refs. [10, 11] is insecure,
and proposed a corresponding solution. Thus we treated
Refs. [10–12] as one protocol in Table I. Similarly, Ref.
[15] pointed out the security loopholes of the protocol in
Ref. [14], and suggested two improvements, with one of
them making use of the decoy state method. Thus we
treated Refs. [14, 15] as one protocol in Table I, and
listed “decoy states” as “optional”. On the other hand,
Ref. [17] commented on the security problem of the pro-
tocol in Ref. [16], and proposed a modification which no
longer requires decoy states as Ref. [16] did. Thus we
listed them separately in the table.
As we can see, all previous protocols [9–22] require
much more quantum resources than ours. First, quan-
tum memory (at least short-term one) is required in all
these protocols, as there are always some parts of the
quantum states which cannot be measured immediately
once they are received, because the participants cannot
determine the measurement basis or the location of the
states used for the security checks, until they receive some
necessary announcement from other parties. Secondly,
most of them (except those in Refs. [13, 21, 22]) have to
rely on quantum entanglement. To compare two num-
bers a and b satisfying 1 < a, b < N , the protocol in Ref.
[9] even requires the use of 2N -level entangled states.
Thirdly, some protocols [9–12, 19, 20] require the use of
joint measurements on multi-particle states. All these
technical requirements seriously lower the feasibility of
the protocols. Furthermore, the decoy state method is
sometimes adopted [9–12, 15, 16, 20], which requires a
large amount of quantum transmission and thus reduces
the efficiency of the protocols. Even so, some proposals
[9–12, 18–22] still involve QKD as parts of the protocols.
On the contrary, in our protocols, other than using
QKD to transmit classical information, no more quan-
tum states and operations are required. Since there ex-
ists QKD protocol [23] in which entanglement, joint mea-
surements and quantum memory are not necessary, our
protocols are much easier to be implemented than all
previous proposals.
5TABLE I: Comparison on the technical requirement of our protocols P1, P2 and existing millionaire problem and QPC protocols
[9–22]. All the blank spaces mean “no”.
entanglement joint quantum decoy QKD
measurements memory states
Ref. [9]’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Refs. [10–12]’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ref. [13]’s Yes
Refs. [14, 15]’s Yes Yes optional
Ref. [16]’s Yes Yes Yes
Ref. [17]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [18]’s Yes Yes Yes
Ref. [19]’s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ref. [20]’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ref. [21]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [22]’s Yes Yes
Ours Yes
B. Security comparison
Table II shows the comparison on the security of all
protocols. As we elaborated in the above sections, our
Protocols P1 and P2 manage to meet the security re-
quirements of the original millionaire problem and QPC,
respectively. Alice and Bob know nothing about the se-
cret data of the other party, except what can be inferred
from the comparison result. Trent does not know the
comparison result at all. Both P1 and P2 can also pre-
vent a dishonest Trent from spoiling the protocol.
On the contrary, spoiling the protocol can be done in
many previous proposals [9, 13–22], because Trent can
simply lie in the final stage. But more importantly, even
though all previous protocols [9–22] can prevent Trent
from knowing the exact values of a and b, they still
leak extra information to either Trent or Alice and Bob.
In the protocol for the millionaire problem in Ref. [9],
Trent always knows |a− b|, while the QPC protocols in
Refs. [13–17, 20, 21] have the problem that Trent knows
whether a = b or not, as it was clearly shown in the final
steps of these protocols. The rest QPC protocols [10–
12, 18, 19, 22] is secure against Trent, but besides the
comparison result (a = b or a 6= b), Alice and Bob will
still obtain an extra amount of information on a and b,
as elaborated below.
In the QPC protocol in Refs. [10–12], Alice and
Bob first express a and b in binary representations as
a = a(1)a(2)...a(i)... and b = b(1)b(2)...b(i)... (a(i), b(i) ∈
{0, 1} for all i’s), respectively, then they randomly pick
i = i1, i2, ... and compare each pair of the bits a
(i) and b(i)
one by one with the help of Trent. If all pairs of a(i) and
b(i) turn out to be equal then they know that a = b. But
once they find a difference pair (e.g., a(id) 6= b(id)) which
indicates that a 6= b, they should immediately abort the
procedure without further comparing the rest a(i)’s and
b(i)’s. In this case, only the first few compared bits of a
and b are known to be a(i) = b(i) (i = i1, i2, ..., id−1) and
a(id) 6= b(id). This is insufficient to determine the exact
values of a and b. However, Bob (Alice) will know the
exact values of the d bits of a (b) that are already com-
pared, i.e., they both gain d (d ≥ 1) bits of information
about a and b. Since d > 1 occurs with a non-vanishing
probability, the average amount of information gained
will be larger than, and unequal to 1 bit. Note that in
Refs. [10–12], Alice’s and Bob’s actual secret numbers
that they want to compare are X and Y , respectively,
while a = H(X) and b = H(Y ) are their corresponding
hash values, where H is a secret hash function they share
beforehand. Nevertheless, a good hash function useful for
QPC has to be a 1-to-1 mapping between X and a (Y
and b), otherwise there could be the case where X 6= Y
while the QPC protocol outputs a = b. Therefore, know-
ing d bits of a (b) means that the possible choices of the
value of X (Y ) will be limited to those whose hash values
contain the bits a(i) (b(i)), i = i1, i2, ..., id. That is, there
are also d bits of mutual information about X (Y ) which
become known to Bob (Alice). The use of the hash func-
tion merely changes the type of the information leaked,
while the amount of this information remains the same.
Similarly, in the protocol in Ref. [22] Alice and Bob
also compare the hash values of their secret numbers bit
by bit. Therefore, for the same reason, when they know
that their secret numbers are unequal, there were already
many bits of the hash values become known to both of
them, so that a nontrivial amount of mutual information
is leaked.
The protocols in Refs. [18, 19] leak extra information
to Alice and Bob too. After calculating R in equation
(15) of Ref. [18] or equation (9) of Ref. [19], if R 6= 0,
Alice and Bob will not only know that X 6= Y , but also
know that the number of different bits in the binary rep-
resentation of X and Y is exactly R. Therefore, the
number of the possible choices of the value of Y (X) will
6TABLE II: Comparison on the security of our protocols P1, P2 and existing millionaire problem and QPC protocols [9–22].
All the blank spaces mean “no”.
Alice/Bob gains Trent knows Trent can spoil
extra information the result the protocol
Ref. [9]’s partial Yes
Refs. [10–12]’s Yes
Ref. [13]’s Yes Yes
Refs. [14, 15]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [16]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [17]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [18]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [19]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [20]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [21]’s Yes Yes
Ref. [22]’s Yes Yes
Ours
be limited to
(
N
R
)
, where N is the length of the binary
representation of X and Y . Before the comparison, the
number of choices was 2N . Thus the amount of mutual
information leaked to each of Alice and Bob is I(R) =
log2 2
N − log2
(
N
R
)
= N − log2
(
N
R
)
. If all values
of X and Y occur with equal probabilities, the probabil-
ity for them to have R different bits will be prob(R) =(
N
R
)
/2N . Considering that X 6= Y happens with the
probability p = (2N − 1)/2N , when it indeed happened,
the average amount of mutual information leaked to each
of Alice and Bob will be I¯ = (1/p)
∑N
R=1 prob(R)·I(R) =
N − [
∑N
R=1
(
N
R
)
log2
(
N
R
)
]/(2N − 1) > 1. That is,
knowing the value of R makes Alice and Bob each gain
more than 1 bit of extra information from these proto-
cols.
Thus we see that all previous protocols [9–22] leak ex-
tra information to the parties. Our P1 and P2 win hands-
down in this category as there is no information leaked.
V. SUMMARY
Thus we show that with the presence of a third party,
the millionaire problem and QPC can be solved with
protocols which require QKD as the only quantum re-
source. There is no need for entanglement, joint measure-
ments, quantum memory, etc.. As QKD is already well-
developed experimentally, our protocols are fully feasible
with currently available technology.
Moreover, all previous protocols leak extra informa-
tions to at least one of the party. Most of them can
also be spoiled by a dishonest third party. Our protocols
manage to fix all these security problems.
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